Hong Kong, January 21 (ANI): Chairman Xi Jinping once looked supreme, unimpeachable and irreproachable. He was perched high upon a pedestal he and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) erected after he became supremo in 2012.
At first, he could do no wrong, as China’s economy and military might inexorably grow. However, a lot has happened since then, and the gloss of his aura has rubbed off and is now tarnished.
Much of the reason for that has been Xi’s poor handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, increasingly restrictive surveillance and control over the minutest aspect of Chinese society, unstinting support for tsar Vladimir Putin and his war machine, and his failed economic policies.
Consider too that Xi and a militant CCP have done nothing to endear themselves to other nations – as China grabbed territory in India and the South China Sea, tightened the screws against Taiwan, trampled on human rights in Xinjiang, and subjugated Hong Kong. He has rubbed neighbours up the wrong way and alarmed Europe and the US.
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been complicit in all manner of sabre-rattling activities and in bullying others smaller than themselves. Yet the PLA is in a degree of disarray, wracked by scandal, corruption and political interference. Commander-in-chief Xi is not filled with confidence in his armed forces.
Furthermore, the PLA seems to be reacting somewhat to Xi’s constant remonstrations and “meddling” with the CCP’s armed wing. As an example, the PLA Daily recently championed the virtues of collective leadership in an article published on December 9, 2024.
Such a plea was a direct insult to Xi, who unceremoniously scrapped recent CCP practice by elevating himself far above anyone else in the hierarchy and rolling back all the advantages that collective leadership provided in recent decades.
When Xi came to power, he insisted that all decisions should “rely on a single voice of authority,” something the PLA seems now to be agitating against. Amidst such unfavourable conditions at home and abroad, opposition forces are slowly stirring, although, of course, the country’s Orwellian security apparatus prevents anything from breaking out into the open, at least for now.
Willy Wo-Lap Lam, a Hong Kong scholar who writes for The Jamestown Foundation think-tank in the USA, believes Xi is in trouble. Indeed, Lam has identified four key opposition groups against Xi: retired Politburo Standing Committee members; fellow princelings; some military top brass; and some in China’s middle class.
Lam noted: “As a result, his ability to shape policy in the financial, foreign affairs and other arenas has been truncated. It might be far-fetched to speculate that Xi, the so-called ‘eternal core of the party’, might be driven out of office this year, but it is crucial to understand who his enemies are and how they challenge the commander-in-chief.”
Xi, a one-man band possessing supposed godlike knowledge and control over every aspect of policy, must take responsibility for the economic malaise in which China now finds itself. Lam asserted that “Xi’s clout over economic decision-making appears to have been reduced,” and he cited two Xi-led commissions – the Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission and Central Comprehensively Deepening Reforms Commission – that now seem to meet only sporadically.
Lam opined that this “could be due to the underwhelming results of the massive program of monetary and fiscal quantitative easing – known to Chinese officials as ‘using ample water to undertake massive irrigation’ – that has been executed since September”.
Xi’s abrasive foreign policy stance also seems to be undergoing a marked change. His “wolf warrior” approach to diplomacy is being jettisoned as China covets precious exports and as the US and other multinational corporations pull out of China.
Xi even sent an envoy Vice-President Han Zheng to attend Donald Trump’s president inauguration on 20 January, the first time Beijing has ever sent an official to such an American swearing-in ceremony.
Returning to the four opposition groups, Lam provided further details on each in his article written for The Jamestown Foundation. Former party heavyweights have been kept under tight reins by Xi.
For example, they cannot hold meetings or travel around China without Xi’s permission. There are rumours many of these elders have disapproved of Xi’s policy directions since the Third Plenary Session held in July 2024.
Interestingly, former premier Wen Jiabao and Li Ruihuan, former chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, sat either side of Xi at the official banquet on the eve of 1 October.
This was a subtle signal by Xi that he is receptive to advice from former leaders. Of course, such former luminaries have no power to remove Xi, but China’s leader is being forced to acknowledge criticism from elder statesmen.
Princelings are another group dissatisfied with Xi. He has worked hard to marginalize those with “red genes” (the so-called princelings) as he considers them competitors to his own authority. Many have become fierce critics of Xi, particularly those who grew rich from their privileged positions and who moved overseas with their families to preserve their ill-gotten gains. It is reported many are collaborating with foreign intelligence agencies.
Lam discerns that wider social discontent is rising, with anti-party and anti-Xi activities increasing. The academic noted: “These appear to consist largely of victims of Xi’s policies, including those [policies] that prioritize state-owned enterprises at the expense of private capital, those that have led to mass unemployment for graduates from high schools and colleges, and those that have created the conditions for the current economic downturn. Members of the middle class who still can get foreign exchange on the black market are voting with their feet by moving overseas. This is in addition to the tens of thousands of mainly low-income Chinese who are estimated to have attempted to flee to the United States via Central America in the past year.”
An example of such protests occurred recently in Pucheng, Shaanxi Province after the local government tried to play down a student suicide after he had been repeatedly bullied by classmates whose families had party connections. Because the police did not want to upset local CCP officials, they tried to hush up the incident. Such behaviour led to violent protests by people angry at incessant censorship and the blatant excesses of card-carrying party members.
Lam concluded: “The gradual though relentless dwindling of Xi’s authority could adversely impact Beijing’s plans to reflate the economy or to repair relations with the West. On the economic side, the monetary and fiscal stimulus announced since September is far from sufficient to assuage local government debt.”
Xi has no desire to give up the reins of power, and he will continue to grimly hold onto them through all the current ups and downs. The Hong Kong professor added,
“Xi seems uninterested in changing course. The continued lack of reports on his succession planning reinforces the sense that he intends to remain in power until 2032.” One wonders whether outright protest against Xi will boil over between now and then. Lam believes a number of top brass in the PLA are unhappy too, amidst mass firings and political turmoil. The PLA has held high-level meetings without Xi even being present.
Examples are meetings hosted by General Zhang Youxia, the highest-ranking vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), on September 13 and October 22, 2024, an indication that Xi might be losing control over personnel arrangements.
Incidentally, Zhang was the boss of General Li Shangfu and General Wei Fenghe whom Xi sacked in 2023 and 2024 respectively. Zhang is due to retire in 2027, but the impact of personnel troubles in the PLA remains a dark cloud. Lam even suggested that the current investigation of Admiral Miao Hua, Director of the Political Work Department, may be an effort by opponents in the PLA to get rid of Xi’s favourite acolytes.
Digging into the topic of PLA chaos, Kenneth Allen conducted a study also published by The Jamestown Foundation. He said, “It is not clear what the impact the overall leadership changes will have on the PLA’s ability to conduct war if needed, but a better understanding of who the key decision-makers are provides a starting point for assessing the PLA’s readiness.”
Xi has reduced the size of the CMC to just six members, including himself as chairman. The current CMC comprises vice-chairmen Zhang Youxia and He Weidong, and other members Liu Zhenli, Miao Hua and Zhang Shengmin.
Allen noted, “Corruption apparently continues to be a wider issue that is present at the highest levels of the PLA. Most recently, Admiral Miao Hua was removed from his position as the director of the Political Work Department in December 2024 due to corruption issues, but he has not yet been replaced. It is most likely that Miao’s replacement will be named in early 2025, perhaps at the next plenary session of the CCP Central Committee so that it can be done by a majority vote.”
Allen predicted that of today’s five subordinate CMC members, only two (He Weidong and Liu Zhenli) will likely remain in the job after the 2027 congress. By then, Liu may have joined He as a vice-chairman. Changes in the CMC typically occur every five years during these party congresses. \
Generally, though not always, CMC vice-chairmen can serve until the age of 70, whilst other senior military commanders must retire when they hit 65, according to military law. Therefore, looking ahead to the 21st National Congress, scheduled for late 2027, Allen predicted the CMC would look very different than it does now.
Note too that the defence minister is not normally added to the CMC. China has had three defence ministers since March 2018, with two being removed because of corruption charges. The current minister is Admiral Dong Jun, but he is neither a CMC member nor a state councillor. This indicates that “he wields significantly less power,” according to Allen.
“It also suggests that Xi Jinping is punishing the Ministry of National Defense for its being politically unreliable following the corruption charges that brought down Dong’s two predecessors.”
It is probable too that Dong does not have direct access to Xi, but must go through a vice-chairman or other CMC member first. Such a demotion in influence does not bode well for military-to-military relations with the US if the Chinese defence minister carries little clout.
Allen duly noted, “Based on the estimated age of the key leaders at the time of the 21st Party Congress in 2027, it appears that a major change in leadership will occur at the congress or within two years after the congress. In particular, the service and theatre command commanders will most likely be replaced at their own party congress two years later.”
Analyzing current PLA top brass, Allen listed these as ones who remain based on age: Liu Zhenli (Chief of the Joint Staff Department); Chen Hui (PLA Army Political Commissar); Hu Zhongming (Commander of the PLA Navy); Chang Dingqiu (Commander of the PLA Air Force); Guo Puxiao (PLAAF Political Commissar); Xu Xisheng (PLA Rocket Force Political Commissar); Lin Xiangyang (Commander of the Eastern Theater Command); Liu Qingsong (Eastern Theater Command Political Commissar); Wang Haijiang (Commander of the Western Theater Command); Wang Qiang (Commander of the Northern Theater Command); Zheng Xuan (Northern Theater Command Political Commissar); Huang Ming (Commander of the Central Theater Command); and Xu Deqing (Central Theater Command Political Commissar).
Allen listed ten others who will retire by then, as the PLA suffers significant churn. Furthermore, the PLA’s shift to a corps-brigade structure instead of the traditional corps-division-regiment structure has created difficulties in officer career paths and the chain of command.
Things are not going to get any easier for Xi Jinping. Whether internal resistance from the party, dissatisfaction from the populace, or frustration in the PLA’s upper ranks, it is clear Xi is struggling. His answer has typically been to double down and demand greater loyalty. Unfortunately, loyalty and respect have to be earned, and Xi seems to be frittering that away. (ANI)
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